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age and published by Theodore Igo C. A. Chauncey, representative of the Pennsylvania, should be the first attempt to deal in systematic fashion with the people themselves.[1] Lowell's study, however, is brief and neglects a number of aspects of life, the complex, the unreasonable surrounding birth, circumstances, marriage, and death, all which treatment should be undertaken. Secondly, the "Rossendale study" by Lowell includes a wide region of investigations ranging from birth to the Shadow Function only, while a few exceptions, the exercise research be restricted to a particular village or town. Lastly, he was primarily concerned with the agricultural villages and has little to say about the town of Rossendale Township.

In addition to a primary, enlightenment description of Scottish life, a second problem, of importance to the citizenship of the Middle West as a whole, is about hinged on this. The first basis of this is the question of Scottish nationalism, the expressions of which have recently attracted a great deal of popular attention to this group. Nationalism, which requires no new definition here, is a feature of consciousness. In the West Lowell contemporary trend is analyzed in Europe during the last two centuries. The nation, in each instance, is distinguished from others by criteria, often highly fluctuant, of race or culture. The goal of nationalism is the realization of an autonomous state. In this is achieved a political aim, but the real

[1] Lowell, 1914.

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and it is important not to confuse the ideal of the intellectual nationalists, a free Kurdish commonwealth, with that which the chieftains and their people are now striving to preserve, a society quite unlike the state.

The Kurds, occupying a mountainous terrain, were but superficially governed by the Iranian and Ottoman governments. Inasmuch as the roads were poor or the country impossible for artillery, the Kurds, a well-armed people, were usually the military equals of their governors. The control of the Iranians and Turks was thus largely confined to the maintenance of police posts and army installations and the attempt, often in vain, to maintain public order and collect a few taxes. Helmut von Moltke, writing in 1838, notes:

> It is a well-known fact that the Ottoman empire comprises vast regions in which the Porte exercises no real authority. It is certain that the Padishah (the Turkish Sultan) has to reconquer widespread regions within the territory of his own state. To this category belong the highlands (of Kurdistan) between the Tigris and the Persian frontier.[1]

In recent decades, however, the Kurds, notably in Iraq and Turkey, have been subjected to the full impact of the modern state and some remarkable changes, comparable to similar developments elsewhere in the Middle East, are beginning to take place, challenging the whole structure of their society. This last, as will be seen, is one which is at once tribal and feudal, formerly directed by a landed aristocracy. A

[1]Quoted in Safrastian, 1948, p. 30.

characteristic of it was its extreme decentralization. The Kurdish tenant or tribesman has now suddenly discovered himself to be a citizen, and the Kurdish chieftain to be without his former economic or political power. A new class, that of officials and officers, has been introduced with an unfamiliar system of society, and the result has not been without conflict. The fact that the reaction has been linked with European nationalism makes it the more interesting. The second object of this study is the delineation of this collision, and a consideration of the alterations in Kurdish life since Ottoman times. The recognition that nationalism, commonly considered in the Middle East as a European ideology in new dress, may be paired in some instances with economic and social upheavals of a different order is a matter of great importance in the analysis of the area.

The Kurdish population of Iraq has been estimated at about 400,000, although figures vary considerably, and occupies the mountainous areas north of Mosul, northeast of Erbil, and east of Kirkuk. In many instances their villages have spilled out on the flat expanses of Upper Mesopotamia. A small portion of this populace is nomadic, wintering their flocks in the same plains area, and seeking the pastures of the uplands in the summer. Kurdish Iraq provides a striking contrast to the sun-baked flats and deserts of the central and southern provinces. The terrain is rugged, with peaks reaching 8000 feet above sea level, and is characterized by precipitous heights, deep gorges,

the like underneath the conventional outer garments. [177 291]

Civil officials wear European clothing, discarding the necktie during the summer. A number affect the black wool forage cap instituted by King Faisal I. to replace the red tarbush of Ottoman connotation, rather than the usual European headgear, and others go bareheaded. It is interesting that some Kurdish officials of higher rank prefer the European felt hat, rarely worn by Arab civil servants, and this is taken as a tacit sign of what may be termed the "Kurdish resistance" to Arab rule. For un- [648]
dress attire, the official divests himself of his outer garments and puts on pajamas or the dishdasha, the cassock, and replaces shoes and stockings with open-toed leather slippers of the Bedouin type, these last not generally used by the townsmen. Schoolboys wear a curious mixture, the characteristic garb consisting of a cloth European jacket, a shirt buttoned at the neck, and the baggy white cotton trousers worn by adults as underdrawers. It remains 291
to notice that most wardrobes in the town contain a great variety of second-hand clothing of all types, Arab, Kurdish, and European, and these appear according to the taste or resources of the wearer, particularly for indoor use. Many costumes thus seem to be motley in appearance, because almost any garment is passed through the family until finally worn out. Similarly, much is transmitted from the wealthy [431]
to the poor, for clothing is a favorite benefice at the [735]
time of a festival or great occasion, such as the birth of a son, aside from everyday bequests. The servant of an

army officer may wear his master's cast-off uniform trousers, the servant of an official a frayed shirt or sweater bestowed on him, and so on. On the other hand, a civil official or officer, aside from a few lounging items used privately, never appears in the "national dress" of a Kurd or an Arab, even in part. The Arabic adjective baladi (from balad, "town" or "municipality") is met here for the first time, referring to a "true countryman" in the same connotation as echt deutsch in German, but with an extremely derogatory meaning. An Iraqi who follows a career as an official or an officer has entered a higher class of society, and to misunderstand his new status by wearing, say, a skullcap, a turban, or the Arab headdress, would expose him to ridicule as a "rustic," baladi, who has no understanding of urban manners. This is particularly true of a Kurdish official, for such attire might be interpreted as symptomatic of nationalistic, and hence revolutionary, leanings. While the older aristocracy, the Arab and Kurdish chieftains wear the costumes of their people as a matter of course, there is no democracy of clothing as far as the government service and the governed are concerned.

Most of the men of the district are armed and appear frequently in public carrying weapons, particularly the chieftains and their bodyguards. The simplest and most widespread is the khunjir or dagger which is a curved blade of steel, sharpened on both edges, with a raised central rib. The hilt, without the protection of a guard,

and representatives of the same nation, totalling several millions, are hard by in Iran, Syria, and Turkey. There is some cause for apprehension as there have been no less than six armed Kurdish rebellions, some common to several of the four governments involved and quelled with difficulty, in the past twenty-five years. As in the case of most of the population, th royal family of Iraq is Arab and the language of government is Arabic. The spectre of Kurdish nationalism strike terror in the hearts of government officials, and there is little love lost between Arab and Kurd. Many of th Kurds regard the Arabs as unlawful rulers, at the same time scorning them for the poverty and filth to be found in southern Iraq. "Are you an Arab?" a Kurdish man or woman often challenges a dirty child of the village, "Go wash yourself." On their part, the Arabs, particularly those of the upper classes, following the tradition of Xenophon, regard the Kurds with a mixture of fear and disgust. "Why do you waste your time with those people?" the investigator was asked by an Arab official, "they are all anditz." In spite of these things, there is no bar to intermarriage between the two groups, and any Kurd can rise to great prominence in the government service, although he is _priori_ under suspicion. In 1951 two of the fourteen provinces in Iraq were directed by Kurdish governors, and the command of the army unit at Rowandus was for a time given to a Kurdish staff officer.

In addition, there is a certain amount of rivalry between persons of different provinces or cities, for

economic wealth has been cut from beneath them. In an ideal situation, they may survive only as landowners and as they are able to obtain positions in the government. The situation, however, is far from ideal, and in practice many continue as their forebears, side by side with the new competitors. It cannot be denied that they accord the government considerable aid in the maintenance of order, and, at the same time, provide it with great anxiety in their private warfare and political thought. 565 [178]

This Kurdish aristocracy is by no means feeble in the face of such competition, and has the advantage of popular support and sympathy, particularly, as has been seen, because it represents a highly idealized group. It has been said that the Kurds are easy prey to doctrinaire philosophies, specifically Communism, but among them, save in certain of the well-educated, there is no knowledge or sign of what may be called a "class struggle," or, in older terms, the rich or priveleged against the poor. The struggle is strictly between Kurdish society as a whole and what they consider an alien system. The investigator has talked at length with a number of dissatisfied Kurdish youths, as well as others in whom such sentiments might be expected, and has heard much of "good" chieftains and "bad" chieftains, but never the aristocracy condemned as such. It must not be thought that the speech of this aristocratic group is "reactionary," in the sense of opposition to modern innovations and the desire to return to older ways. Such things as automobiles, modern firearms, wirelesses, and 565 668 177 186

day a larger pot from this neighbor, and each time returned one still larger. Finally, as had been his original intention, Abu Nuwas borrowed his neighbor's largest vessel, one of the greatest value because it was large enough to feed a company of soldiers. This he failed to return, keeping it with the intention of selling it. After several days, the neighbor called Abu Nuwas, and inquired greedily if the great vessel had given birth. "God remains," sighed Abu Nuwas piously, "the pot is dead." "What!" shouted the enraged neighbor, "How can a pot die?" Abu Nuwas placed his arm gently on the other's arm and said, "Think carefully what the judge will say to this after you have accepted the offspring of so many pots. How can a pot give birth?" 539

The elder women also tell the children folktales of various types, but it was not possible to record any of them in detail. The townsman make little use of the madi or "club" of the officials and officers, nor are they interested in alcoholic beverages or gambling. A few, while on a journey in Baghdad, Erbil, or Mosul, may be attracted by the cabarets or the houses of prostitution, but these occasions are rare and there are no such institutions in the town — or the Rowandus district. 538 517 [529] [484] [547] [549]

In masculine conversation, politics, both domestic and international, overshadow any other intellectual topic, and, as might be expected, are strongly coloured by Kurdish nationalism. It is unusual to find a group of Kurds discussing matters of philosophy, science, religion, or the like, and such things find a very small part in current interest. The Kurd, it might be said, is not particularly concerned whether the earth is round or flat, but will hold forth on contemporary affairs in the Middle East almost interminably. Kurdish nationalism, as noted at the outset, 521 [648] [668]

2: Masters E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11
Rowandus

like similar movements among the Arabs, the Greeks, and others, first became a potent factor in everyday life during the nineteenth century, and its principal target at the time was the crumbling Ottoman Empire. Its early protagonists were educated Kurdish officials and officers, organized in the familiar "literary" or "artistic" societies, and from them it spread in more or less extravagant forms to all classes of society. This preoccupation with ethnic independence, however, is not purely political, but is linked with the impingement of the modern state on a society at once tribal and feudal. To this end the warriors for Kurdish nationalism have been the chieftains, who have something more to gain than the vote, and its orators the men of the educated upper class, a point which must be discussed again in concluding this study. Agents of the Allied Powers left the Kurds under the impression they were to be given an independent state in the settlements which followed the first World War, and, insofar as this has been universally denied them (Kurdish literature, for example, is prohibited in Turkey), it is the starting point of most of their arguments. It is unnecessary to treat these nationalistic sentiments in great detail, because, with the ordinary passage of events in the Middle East, they can be exceedingly ephemeral, the friend of one day becoming the enemy of the next. Needless to say, the Kurds themselves are the heroes of these discussions, and, like many popular political expressions, such utterances

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are often unrealistic. These matters, however repetitious, are one of the most popular forms of masculine entertainment. 521 [668]

Conversation is also the principal source of amusement for the women, although, in the case of women of the upper classes, wives of the wealthier townsmen, the chieftains, and the government elite, it is confined to the privacy of their homes. Women of the lower classes gossip freely with one another on the streets or within the women's mosque. Unlike the men, among whom it commands primary interest, a discussion of politics holds little for a woman, and they are occupied with matters which seem to have greater immediate importance, the many topics of gossip which can arise in a small town. Visiting, as previously noticed, is for both sexes an everyday diversion, accompanied either with refreshments or a formal banquet, but public festivals, with music and dancing, provide throughout the year the only outstanding entertainment known by all the townspeople. Those which are held in connection with a birth, a circumcision, or a wedding can occur at any season. The religious feasts, Jayjani Ramazan and Jayjani Kurban, are determined by the lunar calendar and take place at a different time, several weeks earlier, each year. The Sayran festivals always come in the spring, and, although they are nominally secular, their obvious sacred origin has led one to discuss them with religious life. 574 527 796 527

pagan; have largely been forgotten and whose harmony is unimportant. 771

If the account of contemporary religion is related to that of Ottoman times, little can be found which indicates that this is an area of change. The chief complaint of the amateur theologians was not of increasing impiety, but rather of unorthodox practices, and this conflict of puritan with popular religion is centuries old. One striking omission may be denoted, the lack of condemnation of the government elite for gambling or drinking, two diversions prohibited by the faith, in which the townspeople find no interest. In seeking to define those places in which the collision of the modern state with Kurdish life has evoked conflict, it is curious to find that the forbidden amusements of the officials and officers are not used in the criticism of the new order which they represent. However, alcoholic beverages are not retailed openly in the town and the government elite amuses itself in private. It is possible that the exclusive atmosphere of these parties, together with the new and unfamiliar prestige of the officials and officers, overrides possible defamation. Similarly, the most articulate demagogues of Kurdish independence are drawn from the official class and, insofar as they think of themselves as "progressive" like their Arab colleagues, they remain silent about such matters. It was not possible to determine whether or not the revolts of the past were partially phrased in religious terms, but it

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was repeatedly said that they were not. It is difficult 668 ●
to see, however, in comparison with reactionary movements
elsewhere in the Middle East that popular orators would
hesitate to make use of such material in times of crisis.

but the whole structure of society, tribal and feudal, which was only lightly touched by Ottoman rule has been challenged by the modern state. 667

Coupled with the impingement of the state, represented by the monarchy of Iraq, has been the question of Kurdish nationalism. The concepts of this movement are clearly a European importation. They were learned by educated Kurds, officials, officers, and teachers, of the late Ottoman Empire, probably from similarly-affected Arabs, Armenians, Greeks, and other subjects of the Sublime Porte. These Kurds, drawn from the higher ranks of Ottoman society, carried nationalism to the people, and something of their success is indicated by the fact that it is difficult to find a Kurd in the rural areas who is not voluble in political matters. Nationalism, with its extravagant vocabulary, found easy listeners in the Kurdish aristocracy. If their administrative functions were to be usurped by the government and the economic exploitation of the commoners eliminated, the chieftains were to become superfluous, although perhaps none of them said this explicitly. The Kurdish aristocracy, whose lives had been oriented around the vendetta and who led a well-armed population, reacted differently than the impotent noblemen of Tchekov's Cherry Orchard or Keyserling's Abendliche Haeuser. The first general revolt under Shaykh Mahmud took place in 1922 and the second in 1930. A third occurred in 1932, and the last, that of Mulla Mustafa, at the close of the second World War. 668 669

Between these dates there were many other incidents, for example, the assassination of the dictator of Iraq, General Sidqi, by a Kurd in 1937. In neighboring countries, there was a general insurrection of the Kurds in Turkey in 1925 and one in Syria in 1937. The revolt in Iraq in 1930 was common to Turkey and Iran, and that of Mulla Mustafa to Iraq and Iran. All of these were put down with difficulty, and demanded the use of aircraft, armored vehicles, artillery, and, in some cases, European troops. The states were often aided by quarrels among the Kurdish chieftains. It is interesting that the Kurds regard these conflicts with the government in the same light as tribal warfare of the type which arises from the vendetta. It has been noted how brigands and other outlaws frequently have their own private blood feuds with the authorities. Mulla Mustafa was largely driven from Iraq, not by the army, but by Mahmud Beg of the Baradost who had a personal grudge against the Barzani chief and his followers. 668 669

In order to appreciate the place of Rowanduz in this process, it is necessary to review its position. The town, as has been said, is non-tribal and, although the House of Isma'il Beg owns much of its property, is not ruled by any overlord. In this way it has been assimilated without difficulty into the economic system of the state, as opposed to that of the tribe or feudalism. All of its lands have been surveyed and classified, and the taxes are collected directly from the inhabitants. As an administrative center 682 619

S: Edmonds G-5 (1923, 1945) 1957 MA11 Kurd MA11

timate capacity of 110,000 Kw.) is to be completed in 1958 at Dibis on the Little Zab to serve all northern Iraq.

Two of the most widely advertised major projects of the development programme, the great dams at Dukan on the Little Zab and Darband-i Khan on the Sirwan, are located in Kurdistan and are bringing some temporary benefit to the neighbourhood in the form of wages for labour. But their purpose is first and foremost the protection of Baghdad from flood, and the secondary benefits from storage of water will accrue to the lands down stream. Up stream considerable areas of agricultural land will be submerged and many villages are doomed to destruction. The government is understood to be fully alive to the necessity of tackling the delicate problem of compensating and finding new land for the dispossessed cultivators with foresight and generosity, and of balancing these large spectacular works with lesser projects in the upland valleys which will be of more direct and permanent value to the local people. Failure in this regard might well lead to unrest.

III.

The Kurds have not remained unaffected by the rising tide of nationalism that has swept over the countries of the Middle East since the turn of the century; and to understand the attitude of the Kurds of Iraq to the central government of Baghdad we must cast a brief glance backwards over the history of the region both before and after 1918.

In spite of the centralizing policies of the Ottoman and Persian governments a number of quasi-autonomous Kurdish principalities survived in both countries until about the middle of the 19th century. Two of the princely families are intimately connected with the development of Kurdish nationalism: the Badr Khans of Bohtan (still in Turkey) with their capital at Jazirat ibn Umar (now Cizre), and the Babans of Sulaimani. It is not easy to fix on any particular date or circumstance as marking the beginning, or even a turning point, in the development of Kurdish nationalism in the modern sense. Throughout the 19th century, both before and after the suppression of the principalities, there were of course frequent revolts against the central authority in which the leaders did not fail to appeal to racial sentiment in order to rally their followers. Modern nationalism, unlike earlier manifestations of a similar spirit, tend to attach tremendous importance to language. It would be tempting then to suggest that some particular significance attached to the year 1892, when members of the Badr Khan family began the publication of a newspaper called *Kurdistan*, numbers of which appeared at intervals until 1902 in towns as far apart as Cairo, London and (of all unlikely places) Folkestone, England. But in 1892 Hajji Qadir of Koi (*circa* 1817-1894),

5: Edmonds G-5 (1923, 1945) 1957 MA11 Kurd MA11

whose patriotic poems in Kurdish are still recited with approval, was already seventy-five years old and thus formed an unbroken literary link with the days when the Baban principality was, in the words of another poet, 'neither subject to the Persians, nor slave-driven by the House of Osman.'

The first Kurdish political club was founded at Constantinople in 1908 by Amin Ali Badr Khan and General Sharif Pasha of Sulaimani. There was a revival of literary activity during the brief honeymoon after the Young Turk revolution of 1909, when periodicals, anthologies and the like were published at Constantinople in both the northern dialect of Bohtan and the southern dialect of Sulaimani. The preeminence in the south of the language of Sulaimani, which has since established itself as the standard vehicle of literary expression not only in Iraq but also on the Persian side of the frontier, is probably due in part to the patronage extended to letters by the later Baban princes, and in part to the foundation at Sulaimani by the Turks of a military school, cadet from which went on to the academy and staff-college at Constantinople, and so reached a level of education denied to other Kurds;[1] these same officers naturally supplied the intellectual element indispensable for a nationalist movement.

A fresh fillip was given to Kurdish aspirations by the military defeat of Turkey in 1918, and by point 12 of President Woodrow Wilson's 'programme of the world's peace' enunciated in January of the year, which stipulated that the non-Turkish nationalities of the Ottoman Empire should be 'assured of an absolute unmolested opportunity of autonomous development.' Sharif Pasha headed a Kurdish delegation to the Peace Conference in Paris and secured the insertion in the Treaty of Sèvres (10 August, 1920) of provision for the creation in the north-eastern vilayets of Turkey of an independent Kurdistan which the Kurds of Mosul vilayet would have the right to join.

IV.

When the armistice between the Allies and Turkey was signed at Mudros on 30 October, 1918, the British forces pursuing the defeated enemy up the Tigris were about 40 miles south of Mosul city; they were also in occupation of the line of little towns on the high road between Kifri and Altun Köprü. The Turkish troops were required to be clear of the whole of the Mosul vilayet within a fortnight. British policy, dictated by military considerations but nevertheless in full accord with

[1] It was at Sulaimani in 1918 that Kurdish was first made the official language of the administration; a consequence of this was that a large proportion of the officials in the other Kurdish districts later on were Sulaimani men.

5: Edmonds G-5 (1923, 1945) 1957 MA11 Kurd MA11

the idealistic spirit of the time, was at first to avoid commitments in the hills by setting up one or more semi-autonomous Kurdish provinces to be loosely attached to whatever regular administration might eventually be established in the plains. Even before the armistice contact had been established with a certain Shaykh Mahmud, head of the leading Sayyid family of Southern Kurdistan, who was informed that any Kurdish groups or tribes in the three *liwas* of Sulaimani, Kirkuk and Arbil which might wish to accept his leadership would be allowed to do so. It soon became evident, however, that the Shaykh had overestimated his popularity, and his province was eventually restricted to little more than the *liwa* of Sulaimani. No similar initiative was taken in regard to the Kurdish districts in the *liwa* of Mosul, where there was no articulate Kurdish opinion.

This first experiment in Kurdish autonomy under modern conditions was not a success. Within six months the Shaykh, resenting the limitations placed on his freedom to do exactly as he liked, rebelled. After a short military operation he was captured and deported, and the *liwa* was brought under the direct administration of the Occupation Authority. But quite apart from Shaykh Mahmud's personal ambitions there was always present at Sulaimani, among all classes of the population, an abiding conviction, rooted in their history, that the place contained the germs of a revived and extensive Kurdish state of which it was the predestined capital. The belief had little justification either in its physical appearance and commercial importance or in the academic attainments and political experience of its citizens, but it was always in the air. The proposal that Sulaimani with the adjacent districts should once more become an autonomous territory, therefore, had not come to the people as anything strange.

For the other political leaders the fall of Mahmud was thus no reason for renouncing the glittering prize brought so near by the Treaty of Sèvres. Assurances had been given in the British Parliament that the Kurds would not be forced to come under an Arab government against their will, and when the Provisional National Government of Iraq was formed in November, 1920, Sulaimani remained under the direct control of the British High Commissioner. Kirkuk (which then included Arbil) did accept a *Mutasarrif* (Governor) nominated by the new government, but he, like all the other officials, was a local man, and Turkish, the language of the educated urban classes (but not of the majority of the inhabitants), continued to be used for official purposes. When in June, 1921, the Amir Faysal arrived in Iraq as the candidate sponsored by the British Government for the throne Sulaimani refused to participate in the referendum; Kirkuk did participate but accounted for most of the

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negative votes cast. No representative from either *liwa* attended the accession ceremonies.

A difficult situation had been further complicated by the promulgation in January, 1920, by the Turkish Cabinet of a manifesto known as the 'National Pact' which, while conceding the right to self-determination of the Arabs south of the armistice line of 1918, refused to contemplate the surrender of the Mosul vilayet. The Treaty of Sèvres, signed by the representatives of the Sultan nine months later, was never ratified. For the next five years the Kurds were subjected to a campaign of intensive propaganda from Turkey: threats of invasion, clandestine correspondence with urban and tribal leaders, open incitements to rebellion, warnings to 'traitors,' and pervading all, the religious appeal for loyalty to the Sultan-Caliph (until the Caliphate was abolished in March 1924). Small bodies of uniformed Turkish troops actually crossed the border at various points in support of the restless tribes. The administrative boundary in Arbil and parts of Mosul was withdrawn to the edge of the plains, and in September, 1922, the whole of Sulaimani was evacuated. Shaykh Mahmud was brought back in return for an undertaking that he would secure the expulsion of the Turks from the *liwa* and that he would refrain from interfering in the neighbouring *liwas* of Kirkuk and Arbil. But in the intoxicating mountain air these promises were soon forgotten: in November the Shaykh proclaimed himself 'King of Kurdistan,' claimed the whole country down to the Jabal Hamrin as part of his 'Kingdom,' and so far from expelling the Turks sought to use their presence as a lever to press his ambitions. In December the British and Iraqi governments, hoping to rally the more moderate Kurds to resist the aggressor, made a joint communication to certain friendly leaders recognizing 'the right of the Kurds of Iraq to set up a Kurdish government' which should send responsible delegates as soon as possible to discuss boundaries and political and economic relations; but there was nobody capable of taking advantage of the offer, which lapsed.[9]

The prevailing uncertainty and unrest were actually aggravated by the signature at Lausanne in July, 1923, of a Treaty of Peace between the Allies and Turkey, for it specifically excluded the Mosul question from the settlement. In August, 1924, the dispute was referred to the League of Nations. A Commission was sent to examine the problem on the spot, and, in December, 1925, the Council awarded the vilayet to Iraq subject to guarantees that regard would be paid to the 'desires expressed by the Kurds that officials of Kurdish race should be appointed

[9] The activities of Shaykh Mahmud necessitated a series of air and military operations in 1923 (more than followed; Sulaimani town itself was occupied by the Iraqi Army in July, 1924), but the Shaykh continued to harry the administration until June, 1927, when he submitted. He took up arms again in 1930 in sympathy with the Sayfiyeh intellectuals (see below) but gave himself up in 1932.

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for the administration of their country, the dispensation of justice and teaching in the schools, and that Kurdish should be the language of all these services.' The Turkish government at first refused to accept the decision but, by a tripartite treaty between the United Kingdom, Iraq and Turkey signed at Ankara in June, 1926, finally renounced its sovereignty over the Mosul vilayet. The administration of the three liwas was then assimilated to that of the rest of Iraq except in the matter of the official language and the race of the officials.

The Turkish menace was hardly out of the way when the approach of the end of the Mandate for Iraq roused misgivings among the leaders of Kurdish opinion as to the value of the guarantees. Petitions to the League were treated as treason, and in 1930 and 1931 many highly respected Kurdish intellectuals were imprisoned. When the application of Iraq for admission to the League came up for consideration in 1932 the Council required and received from the Iraqi government a solemn Declaration, which was to rank as part of the Constitution, reaffirming its undertakings in regard to the minorities. A special law was enacted defining the areas within which Kurdish and Turkish should be the languages of the local administration, of the law courts, and of primary education.

For the next few years there was little manifestation of political nationalism in Iraq. The hard logic of facts seemed to have persuaded the leaders, some sooner, some later, that their hopes were impossible of realization; most of them settled down quietly, salving their patriotic consciences, perhaps, with the vague idea that one day another world cataclysm might give their sons or grandsons their opportunity and that in the meantime any agitation would do more harm than good.

During the year preceding the outbreak of the Second World War there were indications that the German Legation in Baghdad was spreading propaganda, especially among young men of the official classes, that the Kurds had been grossly betrayed by Britain at the end of the last war but that a victorious Germany was ready to create an independent Kurdistan after the next. But after the actual outbreak of hostilities the older realists remained convinced that neither side was likely to alienate the Arabs for a small and internationally unimportant people like the Kurds, and preferred to take no initiative. In the spring of 1941, when Rashid 'Ali staged his *coup d'état* against the Regent and the lawful government of Iraq, Shaykh Mahmud escaped from Baghdad, where he had been living in honourable exile, and did indeed obtain some support from the younger generation and among the tribes for the idea of a revolt based on the belief that, 'the unreliability of the Arabs' having now become manifest, the Allies would no longer hesitate to give the Kurds

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their 'rights'; but with the restoration of the Regent, a staunch friend of the Allies, the movement, such as it was, lost all momentum.

V.

'Do as you would be done by' is not a maxim that seems to have appealed very much to the various formerly subject peoples, in Europe or in Asia, who have been liberated since 1918, and it was hardly to be expected that the Arabs of Iraq would prove an exception. Even in Ottoman times the three vilayets had been considered as constituting a single unit, Turkish Arabia in British official parlance, and any scheme of partition on racial lines to meet the aspirations of a minority was as unpalatable as similar ideas have been to majorities elsewhere. Against any suggestion that the central government should make a special effort to conciliate the Kurds by recognizing their existence *qua* Kurds and not merely as individuals enjoying the ordinary civil liberties like anybody else, it was at first argued that since the greater part of Kurdistan lay outside Iraq any concession in this direction could only encourage the separatist tendencies of the Kurds of Iraq and that it would lead to demands for similar privileges from other racial or religious groups.

On the Kurdish side, quite apart from the initial unwillingness to accept subordination to the Arabs who had been a subject race like themselves, it was felt that the guarantees given to the League in 1925 and again in 1932 were being either ignored or at any rate grudgingly implemented. Statistics could be adduced to show that the Kurdish districts were not getting their fair share of the social services or development projects. Particularly bitter were complaints that the schools were inadequate in both quality and number, that failure to prepare and distribute school-books in Kurdish was making a mockery of the promises regarding the language instruction, and that Kurdish students were not being accepted for institutions of higher education or educational missions abroad. The big-spending Department of Irrigation was not represented in the north at all. In the sphere of Public Works there were complaints that all the emphasis was on police posts, and it was indeed the fact that even the construction of roads was for some years held back by the defeatist strategy of a Ministry of Defence which regarded them as facilities for an invader rather than a means of consolidating the administration and benefiting the population. The claim, made at the League of Nations and elsewhere, that the Kurds were always adequately represented in the Cabinet was denounced as disingenuous, since the Ministers in question, even if they could claim remote Kurdish origin, generally belonged to families long expatriated and were Arab rather than Kurdish in sentiment.

S: Edmonds G-S (1923, 1945) 1957 MA11 Kurd MA11

Insofar as these grievances had some foundation in fact enough has already been said to show that the prevailing state of affairs was due, in part at any rate, to political circumstances beyond the control of the government, and in part to the restlessness of the Kurds themselves which for long periods had brought the administration in a large part of Kurdistan to a standstill. Some of the neglect, too, was undoubtedly due not to malice but to a tendency, not unknown elsewhere, for the higher authorities to take more thought for the parts of the country near the center than for the distant outposts.

However that may be, the result was that just when the earlier agitators were developing into elder statesmen who, sobered by experience, no longer regarded separation as feasible or desirable there was growing up a new generation nurtured on a sense of grievance and frustration. Resentment was further embittered by insulting references to the minorities not infrequently made by pan-Arab orators in moments of fanatical exaltation. In all the countries of the Middle East the western Powers are regarded as the supporters of the old reactionary Beys and Pashas who have retained most of the political power in their own hands (the charge is unfair but it would prolong this paper unduly to examine it here). It is only to be expected, then, that disgruntled youth (and especially young Kurds with a racial added to a social grievance) should look to Russia for its inspiration. The Russians have long been the neighbours of the Kurds through the Caucasian provinces, and, as we have seen, a small part of Kurdistan lies within the boundaries of the Soviet Union. Even before 1918 Kurdish malcontents in Turkey and Persia were accustomed to seek support from the Russians. For the Russians exploitation of Kurdish unrest would be nothing new, indeed something of the kind has been seen comparatively recently at the time of the short-lived 'Kurdish Republic' of Mahabad in Persian Kurdistan, and again in 1947 when Mulla Mustafa of Barzan, a fugitive rebel from Iraq, was welcomed in Soviet Armenia, given high military rank, and encouraged to broadcast in Kurdish from Erivan.

But with every year that passes any concerted armed revolt becomes more improbable. The mercantile classes, realizing as they do that economically the Kurdish north is bound hand and foot to Baghdad, have never shown any enthusiasm for anything but the mildest form of nationalism, and the programme of development now in hand must have the effect of binding the whole country together more closely than ever before. The old loyalties to religious Shaykhs and tribal Aghas have been too deeply undermined for any self-appointed leader to command a serious measure of support in any violent adventure. The complexity of modern weapons has given the government an overwhelming advantage

5: Edmonds G-5 (1923, 1945) 1957 MA11 Kurd MA11

over tribesmen armed only with rifles and limited supplies of ammunition, and, with the advent of aircraft and new types of mechanical transport suitable for rough country, even their former advantage of superior mobility has passed to the forces of law and order. In any case, those of the old stormy petrels who are still alive have been softened by a growing dependence on the amenities of the towns and on modern luxuries brought within reach by improved communications, while their sons, most of whom have been educated in government schools, are tending to become dependent, like the rest of the new middle class, on regular employment in the army, the civil service, or the professions. Nationalistic agitation might perhaps seek to profit from any agrarian unrest, but apart from this it is likely to express itself in little more than the clandestine circulation of leaflets by societies calling themselves 'communist' or occasional localized riots by students and bazaar loafers.

Whatever the mistakes and short-comings of the past, Iraq is the one country where the existence of the Kurds as such has come to be officially recognized. In Sulaimani and Arbil especially not only is Kurdish the official language but the whole atmosphere of the administration is Kurdish. The sense of being at the mercy of an uncomprehending bureaucracy in a distant capital has been mitigated by a recent measure of devolution applying to the whole country, the Provincial Administration Law, whereby funds are placed at the disposal of, or may be raised by, the local authorities to be spent in accordance with policies locally determined. In spite of earlier handicaps Kurds have risen to the highest offices. One of the intellectuals imprisoned in 1931 has since held the portfolio of Education, and all the necessary books for the primary classes are now available in good, idiomatic Kurdish. A son of Shaykh Mahmud and one of the Shaykh's principal lieutenants, an officer of great ability, have been Minister of Social Affairs in different Cabinets. For two or three years past the Minister of the Interior (a key office, second only to that of Prime Minister) and the *Mutasarrif* of Mosul (the senior provincial governorship) have been Kurds born and bred in Sulaimani. Fair numbers of students are now being sent to Europe and America. If there was ever any justification for the old fear that the Kurds of Iraq would look north or east for their salvation, there can be very little in it now. The present Prime Minister, General Nuri al-Sa'id, has a comprehending and liberal approach to the Kurdish question. It is still too early to say that all the old wounds have been healed, but there seems to be a new spirit abroad that augurs well for the future.

7: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

627 A Hamawand *Agha*, normally a close relative of the leader of the
628 warparty, would be appointed to the conquered village. He would settle permanently in the village with a small group of Hamawand supporters. What remained of the local taxes after their immediate needs were satisfied would be passed on to the *Agha* leader of the original party.

• 668 Conflicts easily arose between the Hamawand usurper and his original backer. As soon as the balance of power changed in favor of the former, and he further felt that he would be able to control the conquered village with his own forces, he would declare himself independent and thereby found a new lineage branch.

It may seem surprising that the smaller group in such a village should be successful in forcibly dominating the larger group for any length of time. As far as the conquest itself is concerned, the point was clearly made to me by the leader of one group of subjected serfs: «In those days, people were so busy with their farms and things, they had no time to be ready with guns and horses. Those who had enough money to feed the men that ride around on horses could conquer such poor villages.» And later, although the local Hamawands may have declared themselves independent of their old village, they could still count on support from their fellow tribesmen in case of revolt. The peasants, on the other hand, had no organization integrating a larger group. Furthermore, it is the peasant group who has the vested interest in peace, so that the crop can ripen and the stores survive. In case of conflict, the Hamawands risked only the loss of an asset, whereas the peasants, no matter what the outcome might be, were practically assured the loss of their whole year's crop.

621 The local group that emerged from these conquests has a very
622 characteristic structure and organization. Except where external administration intervenes effectively, all political power is in the hands of a well organized Hamawand minority, led by an hereditary *Agha*. This ruling group has vested interests in remaining separate from the remainder of the village, and the close tribal organization limited by descent provides the necessary mechanism.

623 This political dominance serves primarily to enforce certain privi-
651 leges in the economic field. The Hamawands regard themselves as

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nowadays the Government takes an active interest in the proceedings and by threat of dire and awful penalties is usually able to settle the affair near the start. Much more serious is a feud in which important tribal leaders are involved; here settlement is extremely difficult and assassinations may apparently continue for generations. One such major feud splits the Rowanduz district at the present time and has become so widespread that the contestants have assumed the scale and significance of political parties. Practically everyone I met seemed to be involved on one side or the other, some as active assassins, others, the majority, merely as intriguers. The term "my enemies" was clearly highly elastic; - as far as I could judge there was no particular distinction between mere political opponents and those one was prepared to assassinate. The allegiance of the more remote contestants is doubtless largely determined by kinship considerations, but this is not always obvious. A nephew of Hamid Amin of Dergala who had been shot in the back a year before was quite closely related to both of the principal contestant families; and there seemed to be no obvious reason why he should be campaigning on one side rather than the other.

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When this particular feud started is not clear, but it was already well established in 1918 and Ely mentions it a number of times; the most recent murder of the sequence occurred the day after I left Rowanduz. The murderer had come out of prison three days before, having been gaoled two years previously on account of an earlier assassination. My records on the subject are certainly very incomplete but even so they show a considerable casualty record:-

Descendants and Relatives of Hamil Agha - 5 dead, 2 wounded, 2 in prison.

Descendants and Relatives of Abdulla Pasha - 4 dead.

Today the affair has become entangled with all sorts of wider issues - Kurdish Nationalism in particular. Accusations of being pro-British, or pro-Arab, or anti-Kurd were levelled at all and sundry, and in the limited time available I had no chance to unravel all the complex of personal antagonisms and rival interests involved. Iraqi-Kurdistan however is now a part of Iraq and it was highly interesting to see how in this new political situation the old antagonisms were being re-aligned to cope with wider issues on a more impersonal front.

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Religious Organisation

Religion is not a subject that the investigator can gain much information on in his first preliminary survey, and my own studies in this field were particularly slender.

*Cf. the feud between the Husseinis and the Nashashibis in Palestine today.

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THE KURDISH REPUBLIC OF MAHABAD

Archie Roosevelt, Jr.

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THE DREAM of Kurdish nationalists, an independent Kurdistan, was realized on a miniature scale in Iran from December 1945 to December 1946. The origin of the little Kurdish Republic, its brief and stormy history, and its sudden collapse is one of the more illuminating stories of the contemporary Middle East. Its strangely discordant themes of tribal warfare, rival imperialisms and social systems, medieval chivalry and idealistic nationalism well illustrate the complexity of the Kurdish picture, involving as it does a people never united and now split among five nations, none of which is sympathetic to Kurdish nationalist aspirations.

[1] ARCHIE ROOSEVELT, JR., served as Assistant Military Attaché in Tehran from March 1946 to February 1947. During this period he made a special study of the Kurdish situation and was one of four Americans to visit Mahabad during the brief existence of the Kurdish Republic.

9: Roosevelt G-5 (1946-1947) 1947 MA11 Kurd MA11
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101 131 648 In September 1941, the British and Soviet forces invaded Iran, toppling over the structure painfully erected by Reza Shah Pahlavi. As his soldiers scattered, they sold or surrendered their arms to the tribes which still roamed the desolate mountains of Iran, holding to their organization, mores, and way of life in spite of the old Shah's efforts to subdue them. Among those thus benefiting from the Iranian collapse were the Kurdish tribes occupying the mountains along the Iraqi and Turkish borders from Maku, in the shadow of Mount Ararat in the north, to Qasr-i-Shirin, on the Kermanshah-Baghdad road in the south.

In the north, the Kurdish tribes in the mountains west of Lake Urmieh found themselves contained by the strong Soviet garrisons in Rezaieh, Shahpur, Khoi, and Maku. In the absence of effective Iranian authority, the Soviets maintained direct relations with the tribes — the Jalali in the north, the Shikak in the mountains west of Shahpur, and the Herki west of Rezaieh. The chiefs of these tribes were allowed to manage their own affairs by the Soviets, who only required that they maintain security and provide grain for the Red Army. At the southern extreme of the Kurdish area, near the Kermanshah-Baghdad road — one of the main supply links between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union — British troops kept the tribes quiet.

622 668 It was in the large area between the British and Soviet forces, in the vacuum left by the fleeing Iranians, that the Kurds were able to regain their autonomy. At first the two main centers of disturbance were Merivan and the Avroman Mountains, where Mahmud Khan of Kani-Senan established a precarious hegemony; and Baneh, where Hama Rashid Khan, long in exile in Iraq, built up a principality which included Saqqiz and Sardasht. Both of these tribal chiefs were recognized for a time by the Iranian Government as semi-official governors of their areas, but were then driven into Iraq by the reorganized Iranian Army. By the fall of 1945, all of Kurdistan south of the Saqqiz-Baneh-Sardasht line was again firmly in government hands. The vacuum was thus reduced to the small area between this line and the Soviet forces based on Rezaieh, in which there was only one town of any size — Mahabad, formerly known as Sauj Bulagh, a few miles south of Lake Urmieh.

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FORMATION OF THE KOMALA

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It was in this town of Mahabad, left to its own devices by the Allies, that the most recent of the Kurdish nationalist movements was born. On August 16, 1943, a dozen young Kurds, most of them small merchants and petty officials of the town, founded the Komala-i-Zhian-i-Kurd, or "Committee of Kurdish Youth." For purposes of secrecy, the membership of the new party was kept below 100 and was organized in cells; the semi-weekly meetings were never held in the same house twice in succession. The Constitution of the Komala was strongly nationalist and membership was restricted to persons of Kurdish descent on both sides of the family, the only exception being for those with an Assyrian mother — an indication of the present close relations between Kurds and Assyrians.

The Komala spread rapidly, not only in Iran but in other countries as well, where Kurds saw in the new group a more vigorous force than in the traditional Kurdish nationalist parties. Chapters of the Komala were founded in the Iraqi towns of Mosul, Kirkuk, Erbil, Suleimania, Rowanduz, and Shaklawa; and there was a chapter functioning even in Turkey, where Kurdish nationalist activity is an offense punishable by death. The chiefs of the tribes in the vicinity of Mahabad also sent emissaries offering help. They were told that they were not needed then, but might be called on in the future.

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It was inevitable that the two great powers primarily interested in the area should eventually hear of the Komala. The British, whose Kirkuk oil fields are located in Kurdish country, kept a watchful eye on developments. Their political adviser in Mosul sometimes ranged as far as Mahabad, while his subordinates were stationed in Rowanduz, Kirkuk, Erbil, and Suleimania. Yet the British could not encourage Kurdish aspirations without arousing Arab resentment, and so remained deaf to the overtures of the Kurdish nationalists.

SOVIET INFILTRATION

With the Soviets it was a different story. At first they were evidently unprepared for active work among the Kurds, although

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they did once, in 1942, invite the leading aghas to Baku. In the spring of that year, when the Kurds raided some villages west of Lake Urmieh, the Soviets even brought back the Iranian army and gendarmerie (though they rendered their possible services ineffective by constant interference). Yet the Soviets eventually realized the potentialities of the situation. The year 1944 saw Azerbaijan and Kurdistan filled with Soviet political officers and other agents, mostly Moslems from Soviet Azerbaijan. The work in Kurdistan centered around the Soviet Consulate in Rezaieh, attached to which was at least one of the Soviet Union's 100,000 Kurds, known as "Captain Jafarov," who wandered freely among the tribesmen and villagers in Kurdish dress.

Soviet activity in Mahabad dates from the time two of these agents, known as "Abdullahov" and "Hajiov," appeared, ostensibly to buy horses for the Red Army. Apparently a chance encounter first brought them into contact with the Kurdish nationalist movement. The story is that Abdullahov met a man dressed in Kurdish costume in an Armenian wine-shop in Mahabad and complimented him on wearing the national dress.[1] This attention aroused the interest of the Kurd, who happened to be one of the founders of the Komala. They fell into conversation, and finally the Kurd asked whether the Soviets would furnish arms if the Kurds were to form a nationalist party. Abdullahov parried with the question, "Who are you afraid of?" The Kurd said that they feared only their own khans. Abdullahov replied with an expression of contempt for the khans; the Kurd then brought him to a private home where he introduced him to the other leaders of the Komala. Further contacts with Soviet authorities were arranged and one of the Komala leaders who knew Russian became the party's liaison officer. From that time, although the party program called for appeals to each of the Big

[1] Kurdish dress consists of a tasseled turban of blue silk, embroidered vest, baggy grey pants of homespun wool, and a huge crimson kammerband, intricately knotted in front, from which protrudes a pipe, the top of a tobacco pouch, and a long, curved dagger. The Kurds, like other Iranians forced to abandon their native dress by Reza Shah, kept their clothes hidden in their homes, a symbol of their national pride, until the Allied invasion, when they suddenly blossomed out in them. Indeed, the tribesmen, safe in their mountains, had never really abandoned them. The Kurds are incorrigible dandies and a poor man among them would rather spend his last coins on a fine sash than on a good *kabab*. Reza Shah's restrictions on their dress had served to make him and his regime all the more hated.

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Three impartially, the Komala moved inevitably into the Soviet orbit.

During this period VOKS, the Soviet international propaganda organization, was starting a number of "Iranian-Soviet Cultural Relations Societies" in all sections of Iran. As the Komala had grown too big to continue meeting in private homes, its leaders now asked the Soviets to found a branch in Mahabad; they hoped thus to obtain a place to meet without attracting too much attention. The Soviets readily complied, and it was founded, not as a branch of the Iranian-Soviet Relations Society, but as the "Kurdistan-Soviet Cultural Relations Society" (Anjoman-i-Farhangi-i-Kurdistan-u-Shuravi). The clubhouse was soon crowded with Kurds, who showed their gratitude to their new patrons by sending ten cases of cigarettes made of Kurdish tobacco to the victors of Leningrad.

It was at a ceremony in the society's clubhouse, in April 1945, that the Komala finally came into the open. The Soviet Consul from Rezaieh and the chief of VOKS in Azerbaijan were honored guests. The main feature of the program was an "opera" in which a woman called "Daik Nishteman" (Mother Native Land) was represented as abused by three ruffians, "Iraq," "Iran," and "Turkey," finally to be rescued by her stalwart sons. The audience, unused to dramatic representations, was deeply moved, and blood-feuds generations old were composed as life-long enemies fell weeping on each other's shoulders and swore to avenge Kurdistan.

At this ceremony the future head of the Kurdish state, Qazi Mohammad, was finally admitted to the party, to the gratification of the Soviets, who had not liked the democratic organization of the Komala and had long been looking for someone on whom they could count to lead it according to their suggestions. At first the Soviets, realizing the strength of the tribes, had approached tribal chiefs with requests to lead the nationalist movement. But only three of them commanded sufficient prestige for the task — Qaranei Agha Rais-ol-Ashair, venerable chief of the Mamesh and the acknowledged leader of the federation of which they were a part; Amr Khan Sharif, chief of the Shikak and "grand old man" of Kurdistan; and Amir Asad of the Dehbokri, die-hard

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conservative who, as honorary chief of the gendarmerie, had been made responsible for security of the area by the Iranian Government. But Soviet overtures to each met only polite evasion.

Thus it was that the Soviets finally turned to Qazi Mohammad, hereditary judge and religious leader of Mahabad, and a member of its most respected family. They were frequent guests at his house and eventually helped him, through pressure on the Iranian Government, to replace Amir Asad as government representative in the area, by his brother Seif Qazi, who took over the title of Commander of the Gendarmerie. Qazi Mohammad is said to have learned of the Komala only about a year after its formation, when he sent emissaries discreetly offering his adherence. Komala leaders had decided not to admit him, fearing that because of his strong and authoritarian character and also because of the deference which they themselves had been accustomed since childhood to show him and his family, he would eventually dominate the party and end its democratic character. When at Soviet insistence the Komala finally did admit him, there came about precisely the result they feared — one-man rule of the party.

Qazi's admission enabled the Soviets to draw the Kurds rapidly into line with Soviet policy, which, by the summer of 1945, began to reflect the growing aggressiveness shown by the Soviets elsewhere. Previously the instrument of Soviet penetration in Iran had been the Tudeh Party, a popular front of Iranian left-wingers which, although successful in other parts of Iran, had never been able to take root in Kurdistan.[2] Now, however, the Soviets were considering a new and ambitious plan — the attachment of northwestern Iran to the Soviet Union. Accordingly they formed an independence party to replace the Tudeh in Azerbaijan, a party which could then without embarrassing the Tudeh in other parts of Iran stage a revolution, declare the province independent, and possibly request incorporation in the Soviet Union. Obedient to Soviet orders, the Tudeh abolished itself and re-formed as the "Democrat Party of Azerbaijan," whereupon it began to use Azerbaijani Turkish as its official language and to demand separation from Iran.

[2] For a discussion of the Tudeh Party, see George Lenczowski, "The Communist Movement in Iran," *Middle East Journal*, I (1947), pp. 29-45. [Source # 24]

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177 668 The Kurds of western Azerbaijan — which includes Mahabad - could hardly have been expected to join a party purportedly dedicated to Azerbaijani Turkish nationalism, so a new party had to be formed to fit them into the Soviet scheme. On September 12, Captain Namazaliev, Soviet Town Commandant in Miandoab, summoned the chiefs of the important Kurdish tribes, together with Qazi Mohammad and Seif Qazi, to Tabriz ostensibly to see the Soviet Consul. When they arrived, the bewildered Kurds were suddenly told to proceed to the railway station, where they were hustled onto a train and taken to Baku. For three days they lived in a villa outside the town and were entertained with tours, the theater, and the opera. On the fourth day they were ushered in to see Bagherov, President of the Azerbaijan S.S.R., who harangued them regarding the wrongs they had suffered under Reza Shah, and said that the Soviet Government would help the new Democrat Party, which was dedicated to freedom for the oppressed and which he strongly urged them to join. He condemned both the Tudeh Party, which he characterized as a group of ineffective trouble-makers, and the Komala, which he said was started in Iraq under the auspices of British intelligence and was nothing but an instrument of British imperialism. Then, after a warning not to say anything about the trip, the Kurds were put on the train to Tabriz, where they were loaded into Red Army vehicles and driven off to their homes.

THE DEMOCRAT PARTY OF KURDISTAN

186 668 The results of the expedition were soon apparent. Shortly after his return, Qazi Mohammad called a meeting of Kurdish notables to announce the formation of the Democrat Party of Kurdistan, which he urged all to join. Concluding from its name that the goal of the party was democracy on the American model, many responded enthusiastically. A manifesto, signed by Qazi Mohammad and 105 leading Kurds, was issued; it stated that the Kurdish people now wished "to take advantage of the liberation of the world from Fascism and to share in the promises of the Atlantic Charter." The declaration said that the Kurds wished nothing but the human and constitutional rights denied them by Reza Shah, and listed their aims as follows:

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1. The Kurdish people in Iran should have freedom and self-government in the administration of their local affairs, and obtain autonomy within the limits of the Iranian State.
2. The Kurdish language should be used in education and be the official language in administrative affairs.
3. The provincial council of Kurdistan should be immediately elected according to constitutional law and should supervise and inspect all state and social matters.
4. All state officials must be of local origin.
5. A single law for both peasants and notables should be adopted and the future of both secured.
6. The Kurdish Democrat Party will make a special effort to establish unity and complete fraternity with the Azerbaijani people and the other peoples that live in Azerbaijan (Assyrians, Armenians, etc.) in their struggle.
7. The Kurdish Democrat Party will strive for the improvement of the moral and economic state of the Kurdish people through the exploration of Kurdistan's many natural resources, the progress of agriculture and commerce, and the development of hygiene and education.
8. We desire that the peoples living in Iran be able to strive freely for the happiness and progress of their country.

The manifesto ended in Soviet style with the words, "Long Live Kurdish Democratic Autonomy!"

The formation of the new party resulted in the dissolution of the Komala and the absorption of its members by the Democrats. Yet from the beginning the tribal chiefs, fearful of communism, were wary of the new party, though many signed a pledge of support presented them by a Soviet political officer touring the tribal areas. This underlying tribal opposition would have made Qazi Mohammad's position untenable had it not been for a fortuitous accession of strength which arrived from Iraq — Mulla Mustafa and his Barzanis.

The Barzanis had been even in Ottoman times one of the most troublesome of all the Kurdish tribes. In the 1920's Sheikh Ahmad of Barzan, considered a god by the Barzanis and neighboring tribes, frequently rebelled against the British, who several times were forced to call in the R.A.F. Finally Sheikh Ahmad, his younger brother Mulla Mustafa, and his principal followers were exiled, first in southern Iraq, then in Suleimania. On June 11, 1942, Mulla Mustafa, who had taken over the leadership from his brother, escaped to Barzan.

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The story of Mulla Mustafa's subsequent struggle with the Iraqi Government, of how he twice defeated the Iraqi army in 1945, and how by judicious use of funds the Iraqi Minister of Interior was able to enlist other Kurdish tribes against him and drive him from Barzan, must be told at another time. Suffice it to say that on October 11, 1945, Mulla Mustafa, Sheikh Ahmad, and about 1,000 armed Barzanis and their families entered Iran at a point north of Ushnuieh. With them were a number of Iraqi petty officials and schoolteachers of Kurdish descent, and Kurdish deserters from the Iraqi army and gendarmerie, including twelve army officers. The latter were men of high caliber, several of whom had been trained in England and had held positions on the Iraqi general staff.

Shortly after his arrival in Iran, the Mulla met a number of Soviet officers, including the general commanding Soviet forces in western Azerbaijan. The Soviets told him to place himself under the orders of Qazi Mohammad, and ordered the local Kurds to feed and house the destitute Barzanis. By the end of October the Mulla's forces, swollen by refugees and adventurers from Iraq, numbered nearly 3,000 men armed with British rifles captured from the Iraqi army, machine guns, and one field piece.

THE KURDISH PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT

In November and early December, Soviet agents circulated among the tribes, telling them to mobilize for the coming struggle for independence and ordering the chiefs to assemble in Mahabad. All co-operated with the exception of the Mamesh, the Mangur, and the Dehbokri. Meanwhile in the rest of Azerbaijan the position of the Iranian Government was rapidly deteriorating. Armed "Democrats," many of them from Soviet Azerbaijan or the Caucasus, began to attack Iranian soldiers and gendarmes, who soon hardly dared leave their barracks. The whole province was in open "rebellion," while the Red Army stopped relief columns sent north by the Central Government to reinforce its hard-pressed garrisons. Finally, on December 10 the Democrats attacked the garrison in Tabriz and forced it to surrender. All eastern Azerbaijan then fell under the control of the newly-formed "Azerbaijan People's Government."

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The fall of Tabriz was the cue for Qazi Mohammad to declare his own area independent — which it had long been in fact. On December 15 at a meeting in Mahabad attended by tribal chiefs, the leaders of the new Kurdish Democrat Party, Mulla Mustafa, and three Soviet officers in a jeep and armed with tommy-guns, he solemnly inaugurated the Kurdish People's Government and raised the Kurdish flag. A national parliament of thirteen members was formed, and on January 22, 1946, Qazi Mohammad was elected president of the new republic. The Minister of War was his cousin, Mohammad Hosein Khan Seif Qazi, a merchant whose military reputation rested on his honorary rank of captain in the Iranian gendarmerie. Seif Qazi, Mulla Mustafa, Amr Khan Shikak, Hama Rashid Khan Banei (just returned from Iraq with his tribesmen), and Zero Beg Herki [3] received the rank of "marshal," and were provided with Soviet uniforms, complete with high boots, stiff shoulder-straps, and red-banded garrison caps.[4]

The new government, which controlled only a minute territory including the towns of Mahabad, Bokan, Naqadeh, and Ushnuieh, sent observers to the opening of the Azerbaijan National Parliament and even convoked a miniature parliament of its own. It also dispatched Mulla Mustafa south to fight the Iranian garrisons in Saqqiz, Baneh, and Sardasht, cut off from each other and their base in Senandaj by the heavy winter snows.

RELATIONS WITH TABRIZ AND TEHRAN

Meanwhile in the north the capture of Rezaieh by the Azerbaijani Democrats brought new problems to the Kurdish government. Although the majority of the inhabitants of the plains west

[3] Zero Beg was a bandit chief originally associated with the famous Shikak rebel chief, Simitko. Upon the latter's defeat and murder by Reza Shah, Zero Beg fled to Iraq, returning in 1941 to carve out a domain for himself in the Baranduz Valley. He was often seen with Soviet political officers and seems to have been their favored protégé. Although of little importance in his own tribe, the Herki, most of whom still followed their hereditary chiefs, these Soviet connections enabled him to play an important role in developments in Kurdistan.

[4] Other officials of the new government were Hajji Baba Sheikh, local religious leader, Prime Minister; Sadiq Haideri, Minister of Works and Propaganda; Nanaf Karimi, Minister of Education; Mohammad Amin Mu'ini, Minister of Commerce; Ahmad Ilahi, Minister of the Treasury; Seyyid Mohammad Tahazadeh, Minister of Health; and Khalil Khosrovi, Minister of the Interior. Only one of these men had been among the founders of the Komala, but all belonged to the middle or upper classes — small merchants, officials, landlords.

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of Lake Urmieh, from Rezaieh north to Maku, are Azerbaijani Turks, the tribes of the hills commanding the plains are Kurds. The Miandoab area, southeast of the lake, also has a mixed population. These areas were claimed by both the Tabriz and the Mahabad governments and were a source of constant friction. Amr Khan and the tribes paid little attention to the Azerbaijani Democrats, and were continually encroaching on the villages and towns presumably under the control of Tabriz. In April 1946, the Soviets brought Qazi Mohammad to Tabriz in an attempt to settle the differences between the Azerbaijanis and the Kurds. It was essential at that time that the two puppet states form a united front, as negotiations were about to open between the Democrats and the Iranian Government for a permanent settlement of the status of the province.

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The final result of talks between Pishevari, leader of the Azerbaijani Democrats, Qazi Mohammad, and the Soviets was a treaty signed April 23, 1946, by the Kurdish and the Azerbaijani representatives. Publication of this treaty caused consternation in Tehran, as its clauses and indeed its very existence showed that the twin Democrat regimes considered themselves independent nations with the right to exchange representatives and make treaties. The text of the treaty was as follows:

1. The two signatory governments will exchange representatives whenever it is deemed advisable.
2. In those areas of Azerbaijan where there are Kurdish minorities, Kurds will be appointed to government departments, and in those parts of Kurdistan where there are Azerbaijani minorities, Azerbaijanis will be appointed to government departments.
3. A joint economic commission will be formed to solve the economic problems of the signatory nations. Members of this commission will be appointed by the heads of the national governments.
4. The military forces of the signatory nations will assist each other whenever necessary.
5. Any negotiations with the Tehran Government will be conducted in the joint interest of the Azerbaijan and Kurdish national governments.
6. The Azerbaijan National Government will take the necessary steps to promote the use of the Kurdish language and the development of Kurdish culture among the Kurds of Azerbaijan, and the Kurdish National Government will take similar steps with regard to the Azerbaijanis living in Kurdistan.
7. Both signatory nations will take measures to punish any individual or

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group seeking to destroy the historic friendship and democratic brotherhood of the Azerbaijanis and the Kurds.[8]

The Azerbaijani Democrats next proceeded to negotiate a settlement in Tehran with the Iranian Premier, Ahmad Qavam. By its terms all Azerbaijan, including the Kurdish areas, became once more nominally part of Iran, while the Democrat leaders were "appointed" to posts in Azerbaijan Province corresponding to those they already held in the Democrat government. The Kurds reacted unfavorably to the agreement. Although they had been represented in at least some of the negotiations by Sadr Qazi, Qazi Mohammad's brother and a deputy in the last Iranian parliament, they felt that their wishes had been largely ignored. Whereas the Azerbaijani Democrats had legalized the positions they had seized, Qazi Mohammad's government now had no legal basis at all. The Kurds had progressed from the condition of a minority in the Iranian state to that of a minority in an Azerbaijani Turkish state.

Finally, Qazi Mohammad himself went to Tehran to voice his disapproval to Premier Qavam. He asked to be made governor of a new Kurdish province consisting of the Kurdish parts of Azerbaijan, combined with the much larger areas inhabited by Kurds still under Iranian control — a territory that would stretch from the Russian border to a point half way between Kermanshah and Senandaj.[9] This new province was to have a degree of local autonomy, with its provincial officials and its army garrison recruited entirely from the local population. The wily Iranian premier agreed to Qazi's proposal, but with the proviso that Qazi must also obtain the consent of Dr. Javid, the Democrat Governor of Azerbaijan. Dr. Javid indignantly rejected the plan, and friction continued between the Kurds and the Azerbaijani Democrats.

Although in the course of these conversations in Tehran a truce

[8] The treaty was signed in Tabriz by Pishevari, Biriya, Dr. Javid, and Sadiq Padegan for the Azerbaijani Democrats, and by Qazi Mohammad, Seyyid Abdullah Gilani, Amr Khan Shikak, Zero Beg Herki, and Rashid Beg Herki for the Kurds.

[9] Senandaj (Senna) was the capital of the province of Kurdistan, the former independent principality of Ardelan. It included Saqqiz and Banah, but not Sardasht, which was administratively part of Azerbaijan. In the present article the word "Kurdistan" has been used to designate Qazi Mohammad's territory, none of which was in the province of Kurdistan.

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had been agreed upon by the Central Government on the one hand, and the Kurds and Azerbaijanis on the other, sniping and skirmishing continued, occasionally flaring up into open warfare. The Iranians, in view of the declared intention of the Soviets to evacuate Iran early in May,[7] now began to take more active military measures. The Kurdish front was held by the Iranian Fourth Division under the command of tall, able General Homayuni, recently transferred from Khuzistan, where he had carried out a vigorous disarmament program among the Arab tribes. In mid-April, Homayuni opened the roads and rushed reinforcements to Saqqiz, Baneh, and Sardasht.

The Soviets were said to have promised the Kurds planes, tanks, and heavy weapons, and to have taken some fifty young Kurds to Baku for military and political training. For the present, however, Qazi Mohammad had to rely on tribal levies to oppose the Iranians. In the hills overlooking General Homayuni's forces was a formidable but divided force consisting principally of the Barzanis, but also including small Kurdish tribes always ready for fighting and looting, and Hama Rashid and his henchmen.[8]

As General Homayuni pulled more and more reinforcements into the area, Qazi Mohammad and the Soviets put pressure on Amr Khan of the Shikak and his allies, the Herki, to come down from the north and aid in the operations. At first Amr Khan demurred on the excuse that his horses were in pasture elsewhere and could not be moved, but at the beginning of May he reluctantly sent his tribesmen to the battle zone.

The month of May 1946 was marked by a number of fierce battles, all fought by small numbers and none of them followed through by decisive operations. In the beginning of the month the Kurds won a victory damaging to Iranian prestige when they surprised an army column on a road march near Saqqiz, killed twenty, and captured thirty-odd prisoners, two machine guns, and 4,000 rounds of ammunition. The Kurdish prisoners were conscripted in the Kurdish army; the rest were sent to Tabriz.

[7] The Red Army finally evacuated Iran on May 9, 1946.

[8] Hama Rashid was of dubious value to the Kurds, as he was continually carrying on secret negotiations with the Iranian army for his reinstatement as Governor of Baneh, and was also suspected by both Kurds and Iranians of a mysterious connection with the British. In August, hearing that plans were being made in Mahabad to have him murdered, Hama Rashid fled back into Iraq.

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668 The Kurds were repulsed, however, in an attack on the Mah-
721 mudabad Pass near Saqqiz, designed to cut the Senandaj Road, and again later after they had seized the hills overlooking Saqqiz. The Iranian army drove them off and erected round watch-towers of mud on the summits, each manned by thirty or forty soldiers. Finally a truce was effected whereby liaison officers were exchanged,* each side was to stay within its lines, and the Kurds were to have the right to inspect vehicles going from Saqqiz to Baneh and Sardasht and so stop arms and ammunition from reaching the Iranian garrisons there. The Shikak and the Herki returned to the north.

CHARACTER OF QAZI MOHAMMAD AND THE KURDISH REPUBLIC

186 After this period of conflict, Qazi Mohammad drew aside his
609 iron curtain and gave non-Soviet observers a chance to look at his country. Although feeling against the British on account of the expulsion of the Barzanis from Iraq, Soviet-sponsored anti-British propaganda, and certain events in the past in which the Kurds considered they had been victims of British opportunism, was too strong to permit them to visit the tiny Kurdish Republic, at various times four Americans and one Frenchman were guests of Qazi Mohammad.

These observers found the Kurdish Republic to be a going con-
642 cern. Although destitute of any legal basis whatsoever, Qazi
621 Mohammad's *de facto* government continued as before, changing only the title of its ministers from *wazir* (minister) to *rais* (chief).
624 Qazi Mohammad himself became merely the leader of the party (Pishwa-i-Hizb-i-Dimokrat-i-Kurd). The villages were run by their old landlords and tribal leaders with the aid of a gendarmerie locally recruited and dressed in Kurdish costume, but commanded by officers from Mahabad with Soviet uniforms. Mahabad itself, from a typically drab Persian provincial town, had become picturesque and colorful, its streets thronging with Kurds in national costume, free for the moment of the hated Iranian soldiers and gendarmes.

*The Kurdish Iranian officer was "Colonel" Mohammad Nazarzadeh, one of the original founders of the Komala, later killed when the Iranian army plane in which he was traveling crashed near Bonab.

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Those who had an opportunity to meet Qazi Mohammad could not fail to be impressed with his personality, and easily understood how he had become a symbol for Kurdish nationalism everywhere. A short man of fifty, dressed in an old army overcoat, he had a lightly bearded, ascetic face, slightly yellowish in complexion from a stomach complaint. He neither smoked nor drank and ate very little. His voice was gentle and well-modulated, his gestures quiet but effective. Something of an internationalist, he was interested in all the peoples of the world and knew many languages, including Russian, a little English, and Esperanto. His desk was customarily littered with grammars and readers and literary works in foreign tongues.

He seemed to be a man of deep convictions, backed with a rare courage and self-sacrifice, but tempered with broad-mindedness and moderation. During the period in question, at least, his demands were moderate: Kurdish autonomy within the Iranian state. He professed to share the view of many Kurds that since they were members of the same Iranian racial family as the Persians proper, there was no reason why they could not form the same combination as did the ancient Medes and Persians. Qazi himself thought the Kurds were the descendants of the Medes, and liked to give his own etymology of Mahabad — "abode of the Medes."

Yet it would be impossible to deny that he and his followers also held pan-Kurdish aspirations and hoped to make Mahabad the center of Kurdish culture and the Kurdish nationalist movement, replacing Syria and Suleimania, its centers at the present time. Great efforts were being made to put Kurdish education on a sound footing. At first Kurdish teachers had to translate from Persian textbooks orally in the classroom, but shortly before the fall of the Kurdish Republic, textbooks in Kurdish had been printed for the primary grades. In addition to a newspaper and a political monthly periodical, both called *Kurdistan*, there were published two primarily literary magazines, *Hetaw* and *Hilal*.[10] All of these were printed on a press presented by the Red Army to

[10] A number of other Kurdish periodicals had been published during the Komala period, such as *Kalawizh* and notably *Nishtiman*, official organ of the party, which bore a picture of Saladin on the cover and circulated in Iraq as well as Iran.

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the Democrat Party of Kurdistan. The importance Qazi Mohammad attached to literature and the Kurdish language may be adduced from the presence on his staff of two young poets, Hazhar and Hiseman, whose poems were published in spite of the paper shortage.

Although these efforts did not suffice during the republic's short life to bring it anywhere near the standard of the other two centers of Kurdish culture where Kurdish has been freely written and taught for twenty-five years, politically at least Mahabad was the focal point toward which all Kurdish eyes now were turned. In intellectual Kurdish circles in Beirut, Istanbul, and Baghdad, as well as among the wild mountains of western Asia, all were watching to see whether Qazi Mohammad would succeed or fail. Couriers brought communications to him from groups of Kurds not only in Iraq but in Syria and Turkey as well. His movement appealed especially to the young people, who felt that the older nationalist parties had not accomplished much. In Iraq, for instance, a new secret party, the leftist "Rizgari," was formed of these elements.

ANTI-SOVIET SENTIMENT

The old nationalist parties, the Hewa in Iraq and the Khoybun in Syria, were not enthusiastic about Qazi Mohammad because of his Soviet connections. Fear and even hatred of the Soviets among the Kurds is strong for several reasons. In the first place, most Kurds are deeply religious and remain distrustful of the Soviet attitude toward religion. Furthermore, many of them have met refugees fresh from the Soviet Union or have talked to Moslems in the Red Army, few of whom paint a rosy picture of the lot of Oriental peoples under Soviet rule. It must also be remembered that the Russians have been traditional enemies of the Kurds since the days of the Tsars. Russian troops in World War I fought over a large part of Kurdistan, leaving a trail of ruin and depopulation still traceable in many Kurdish valleys and villages. In Mahabad itself, Russian troops had been under orders for several days to shoot anyone appearing in the streets, and the town was looted and burned. None of this has been erased from the long oriental memories of the Kurds, who still frighten their crying

Pr Roosevelt G-6 (1942-1947) 1947 MA11 Kurd MA11
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children into silence by threatening them with the word "Russian."

The Soviets tried hard to counteract this unreceptive attitude. They played up "Kurdish autonomy" in the Soviet Union, and the brave deeds of one Samand Siamandov, Red Army colonel of Kurdish origin, "Hero of Leningrad." How much success they had is hard to judge, but certainly large sections of the population, as well as landlords, merchants, and religious leaders, continued to distrust them and to extend this distrust to Qazi Mohammad, whose connection with the Soviets was undeniable. The walls of the building in which his government was housed were plastered solidly with Soviet propaganda posters; his newspapers and magazines contained a large proportion of Soviet material translated word for word into Kurdish; and his poets composed panegyrics to Stalin and the Red Army.

Yet in contrast to the rest of Azerbaijan, Kurdistan was to outside appearances free of Soviet agents. Aside from a few Iran-sovtrans truck drivers, who acted as observers for the Soviet and pro-Soviet governments, Soviet citizens were almost unknown in the area and Soviet agents kept under cover. There was said to be a Soviet representative in residence in Mahabad, though his presence was denied by Kurdish authorities.[1] Hashumov, Soviet Consul in Rezaieh, and his assistant Aliakbarov made occasional trips to Mahabad.

While terrorism reigned unchecked in eastern Azerbaijan, in Kurdistan there were few if any political prisoners and only one or two cases of what may have been political assassination, though a number of Kurds not in sympathy with the regime did flee to Tehran. In the streets of Mahabad one could hear radio broadcasts from Ankara or London, while in Tabriz to listen to these brought the death penalty. Whether the reason for this freedom was the moderation and liberalism of Qazi and his cabinet, or the presence of the tribes who would not tolerate violent action against persons connected with them, the net result was to make the regime popular at least among the citizens of Mahabad, who enjoyed their respite from the exactions and oppression they

[1] The last of these Soviet advisers, one Amalov, is said to have been in Mahabad until the last days of the republic, when he fled to the Soviet Consulate in Tabriz.

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641 considered to be characteristic of the central Iranian Government.

OPPOSITION OF THE TRIBES

If the Soviets kept their overt interference to a minimum in
249 order to reconcile the tribes to the regime, they were certainly un-
578 successful. In addition to historical, social, and religious reasons
• 669 for the tribes' opposition to the Soviet-supported government,
177 there were strong economic ones. The Kurdish tribesmen depended largely on their tobacco crop for their livelihood, and now that their market in the rest of Iran was cut off they suffered considerable hardship. In certain areas food supplies already strained had to be shared with the destitute Barzanis, who had long outworn their welcome.

This tribal discontent was at its strongest in the south where the deceased Qaranei Agha's son, Mam Aziz, chief of the Mamesh, along with his ally, Bayazid Agha of the Mangur, so openly opposed Qazi Mohammad that the Soviet vice-consul finally came down from Rezaieh and threatened to have the Barzanis sent against them. When Mam Aziz continued to resist, the Barzanis did indeed attack him and he was forced to flee to Iraq with some of his tribesmen. From Rezaieh north, the tribes looked to the leadership of Amr Khan Shikak, who had resigned from his position in Qazi's government as minister of war and for the time being was keeping aloof in Zindasht, his mountain capital southwest of Shahpur. The only tribes Qazi Mohammad could count on were the Gawrik of Mahabad, numbering less than a thousand armed men, and part of the small tribe of Zerza, in the Ushnuieh region. Even Mulla Mustafa and his Barzanis did not get on with Qazi Mohammad, who was no longer able to feed them.

668 Thus it was that Qazi Mohammad, in the face of the increasingly aggressive attitude of the Tehran Government, found himself almost without support. Despite Soviet promises of aid and matériel, in the fall of 1946 Qazi Mohammad was still without either heavy weapons or trained men, or indeed any effective army at all. As Iranian preparations became increasingly obvious, Qazi sent frantic messages to the tribes, his only hope, say-

Pr Roosevelt G-8 (1946-1947) 1947 MA11 Kurd MA11
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• 668 ing that the Soviets had promised the Kurds their support and demanding that the tribes come to the front to fight the Iranian Army. The tribes refused.

RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF IRANIAN CONTROL

Meanwhile, events were moving rapidly. The Tehran Government had been insisting that the Democrats surrender the district of Zenjan, which is not in the province of Azerbaijan. When the Iranians seemed about to back up this demand by force, the Democrats agreed to evacuate the area, and by the end of November it was completely in the hands of the Iranian army. Shortly after midnight, on December 10, the Iranians attacked Democrat positions in the Qaflankuh Pass, south of Mianeh; within twenty-four hours resistance had collapsed and the Democrat leaders were in headlong flight to the Soviet Union, a year to the day after their capture of Tabriz. In his telegram of surrender to Premier Qavam, the Democrat Governor stated that the Kurd commander, Seif Qazi, had been informed of his decision and had been told that he was expected to order his forces to cease hostilities.

On December 13, Qazi Mohammad's brother, Sadr Qazi, a deputy in the Iranian Parliament who had been in Mahabad acting as go-between for his brother and the Iranians, appeared at Miandoab. There he told General Homayuni that the Kurds were ready to receive the Iranian army peacefully. The general said he would move his forces in as soon as the Barzanis were evacuated from the Mahabad area. He sent forward an advance party of pro-government tribesmen, including some of the Dehbokri and the Mamesh and Mangur who had returned from Iraq, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ghaffari. These were stopped not far from Mahabad by a representative of Qazi Mohammad who said that the agreement with General Homayuni called for occupation of the town by regular troops, not by tribesmen who might cause disorder. The tribesmen finally retired without fighting, and on December 15, 1946, after the Barzanis had withdrawn to Naqadeh, the Iranian army entered Mahabad, thus bringing to an end the year-old Kurdish Republic.

The Iranian army was given a great reception, and Qazi

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Mohammad and the army commanders exchanged visits. But on December 17 a number of Kurds were arrested, and the following day Qazi Mohammad, Seif Qazi, and many others were imprisoned. The only members of Qazi's government to remain at liberty were Hajji Baba Sheikh, immune because of his religious standing, and a handful of Kurds who had fled to Iraq or hidden in the villages. In addition to imprisonment, Kurdish leaders were further punished by having tribesmen quartered in their homes, eating at their expense — a time-honored Iranian method of imposing a fine without holding a trial. On December 30, Sadr Qazi, who had returned to Tehran, was brought from his home to Mahabad and imprisoned with his brother, although he had throughout the year left Tehran only when his services as mediator were required by the Iranian Government. The army asked all persons who had grievances against the prisoners to present their evidence, and after an examination by a military court condemned Qazi Mohammad, Seif Qazi, and Sadr Qazi to death. At dawn on March 31, 1947, they were hanged in the square of Mahabad.

The Iranian military government has carried out a program to eradicate all traces of Qazi Mohammad's regime. The Kurdish printing press was closed, the teaching of Kurdish prohibited, and all books in Kurdish were publicly burned. To show the tribes it meant business, the army executed eleven petty tribal chiefs of the Faizullah Begi and the Gawrik of Saqqiz.

One feature in the reconquest of Mahabad needs to be noted. Everywhere else in Azerbaijan, peasants, workers, and shopkeepers massacred the Democrats at the first indication of their collapse. This spontaneous reaction clearly indicated the hatred felt by the people for the regime. Yet in Mahabad, all passed peacefully, a circumstance especially remarkable in that elsewhere in Azerbaijan the secret police was strong and prepared for such emergencies, while Qazi Mohammad did not even have such an instrument. This fact would tend to confirm reports that Qazi Mohammad's regime was popular — at least in his own capital.

In the north, Amr Khan and the tribes under his influence took no active part in these events. The Iranian army, evidently not

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669 wishing to incur obligations, had not informed Amr Khan of its projected move into Azerbaijan, and so by the time he had gathered his tribesmen to attack the Democrats, the war was over. Amr Khan and the other chiefs quickly sent the Iranian commander professions of loyalty. All were accepted back in the fold except Zero Beg, whose tribesmen ambushed some Iranian soldiers in Balaneah, near Reza'ieh, while he was conferring there with General Homayuni. Zero consequently had to flee, accompanied by a few tribesmen and Assyrians, to Ushnuieh, where he found Mulla Mustafa and his Barzanis in a state of precarious truce with the Central Government. The Mulla finally refused the government's order to disarm his tribesmen or return to Iraq, and fighting broke out again. By June 1947 the Barzanis had fought their way north to Maku and seemed about to cross the border into the Soviet Union.

IN SUMMARY

177 186 668 This latest attempt to found a Kurdish state ended with the Iranian occupation of Mahabad. Like previous attempts it failed largely because of disunity among the Kurds themselves. One of the dilemmas of Kurdish nationalism is that while not only its leaders, but nearly all its rank and file, must come from the more enlightened townspeople, its military strength has always had to come from the tribes and their chiefs, with neither the education nor the imagination to look for anything but gain and loot in the weakening of government authority. During 1946 the Kurdish tribes, naturally opposed to government control, felt as restive under Qazi Mohammad as they had under the Central Government, even though he was of their own race. Because of this feeling, as well as their distrust of Qazi's Soviet connections, the tribes almost all sided with the Iranian army.

The principal immediate reason for the collapse of the republic was the failure of Soviet support to materialize. A young and strong nationalist party which might have united a majority of educated Kurds was infiltrated by foreigners who used it for their own purposes and then let it be destroyed. The miniature state had been built under the protection of the Red Army, and continued to exist after its evacuation only because of the possibility

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of its return. When the Kurds no longer hoped for this, and the Iranians no longer feared it, there was no chance for Qazi Mohammad's movement to survive.

The whole episode was a serious blow to the development of Kurdish nationalism. There is now no Komala and no Democrat Party of Kurdistan, and many of the potential leaders of the Kurds are dead, in prison, or in exile. Yet this does not mean that Kurdish nationalism is finished. The Kurdish Republic found its support among those progressive elements of the population which seem bound to increase in numbers and importance, and was opposed by those elements which seem destined to disappear. It remains to be seen whether Kurdish nationalism is practical in an area where, until recently, nationalism was an unknown conception and men still give primary allegiance to their religious and tribal chiefs. The Kurds have never been combined in a stable state of their own and enjoy no ancient unifying culture. Separated from each other by mountain barriers, they have always had to look for their cultural and economic needs to the capitals of the different states in which they have lived.

If the states the Kurds inhabit allow their Kurdish populations a degree of local autonomy and give up the attempt to force an alien nationalism upon them, they may succeed in obtaining a loyalty similar to that found in Switzerland with its multinational population. The Arab countries have made a start in this direction. A similar policy in Iran, if left free of foreign penetration, might be a cause of closer unity rather than of separatism between two of the nation's peoples.

21: Fisher S-4 (no date) 1950 M1 Middle East
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claim the right of wintering in the Christian villages of Armenia, and, as fanatical Moslems, they indulged on occasion in massacres of their unwilling Christian hosts—this often with the connivance or tacit approval of the Turks, who were not reluctant to see the Christian communities of Asia Minor decrease in numbers.

For obvious reasons, detailed figures as to the number of the Kurds are not available,[1] but estimates, some of them much out of date, give a total of some 3 millions, distributed as follows :

Turkey	1,250,000
Iraq (1924) . . .	494,000
Iran	700,000
Baluchistan . . .	350,000
Transcaucasian Russia (1911)	125,000
Syria	100,000
Afghanistan . . .	20,000

The Kurds cannot be said to have any advanced political feeling, and, even less than the Badawin Arabs, have rarely been able to combine for long in a stable, large-scale political organisation. Individualism and local tribal feeling are the chief characteristics. Kurdish political activity has been negative : that is, strongly against any other group that has tried to rule them, and their predilection tends to be anti-governmental, whatever the composition of the latter may be, rather than for pro-Kurdish aims. Since 1923 there have been ten serious revolts by the Kurds against various national governments—two against Turkey, four in Iran, and four in Iraq. One of these, in 1947, made use of weapons looted from Iranian military depots. Such revolts lend themselves to intervention by outside powers ; and an American view [2] is that a Kurdish revolt against Iran in 1942 had tacit support from Russia, with the aim of embarrassing the Iranian government. Little was finally achieved, however : one factor may have been the importance at the time of American lease-lend supplies to Russia, as the result of which the U.S. was able to exert some moderating influence on Russian policy.

Since 1927, a Kurdish independence movement, the 'Khoibun', has been in existence, but its activities have hitherto had little success, the main obstacle being jealousy, division, and lack of co-operation among the Kurds themselves. An attempt was made to enlist

[1] In modern Turkish statistics the Kurds are described as 'Mountain Turks'.
[2] That of Professor W. L. Westermann.